I have just found a report sent to the Ministry of Defense in April 1958 by Lt. Colonel Jeanpierre of the first REP Corps. This report highlights the lessons learned from four months of intense fighting on the Tunisian border (Bataille des Frontières) that took place from January to the end of May 1958. Enemy losses amounted to 1528 killed, 23 prisoners, around 512 weapons recuperated including 26 machine guns, 13 automatic rifles, several rocket launchers and mortars. This man was my commanding officer for five years and I reported to him directly as part of the intelligence group. Jeanpierre was the only Corps leader killed on active service when his helicopter was hit by machine gun fire in pursuit of an enemy column on 29 May, 1958. He was the first chief to establish a doctrine on the use of helicopters, considered the only valid and costeffective modern engine in subversive warfare where success is due to a) intelligence b) the use of crack troops and c) the shock of rapid deployment. The alternative is a slow, discreet deployment under cover of darkness with units converging on the objective from different directions, taking the enemy by surprise and cutting off any retreat.

Conclusion of Lt. Colonel Jeanpierre's report to the Ministry of Defense on combat in the Guelma region

There were, of course, many lessons to be learned from the combat led by the First REP and its mobile group. It is not the place here to build a theory of tactical action for subversive warfare. I would however like to underline two points:

- The importance of intelligence

- The need to reassert the value of infantry and restore its true colors.

Counterinsurgency action calls for practical intelligence that is tactical and immediately exploitable. Our army would appear to be fundamentally incapable of producing intelligence of this kind.

In our military teaching, whether it is dispensed on the benches of our military academies or at a very much higher level, we always find the enemy. It would be inconceivable for the red group not to confront their blue adversary in our exercises and themes.

However, it is what happens nine times out of ten since Indochina and even here in Algeria, ZEC apart.

Whenever an operation is not mounted on precise intelligence from the outset, the first objective must be to procure such intelligence.

Too many individuals in our army are involved with ‘Deuxième Bureau' activities and too few with basic intelligence gathering. Intelligence is gained on the ground.

Intelligence is something alive and solid that adds up and takes shape with one thing leading to another. Intelligence requires living the life of the insurgent without him realizing it. Intelligence is work for the imagination. It consists not only of interrogation and agents but is also the electrical network that one cuts into and that communicates. It is the early warning system. It is the combatant in the field who says precisely what's in front of him.

In the action that we are leading here, everything should be about intelligence. As a priority, it would be good to give intelligence the place that it deserves in our military teaching.

Getting intelligence is not everything. Again, we have to be able to exploit it successfully. Only well-trained infantry can do that.

Today's insurgent has no mortars, canons, tanks or aircraft. At most, he has at his disposal a few hand grenades or a rifle. In every engagement, he deploys rifles and automatic pistols and rifles. This is infantry combat pure and simple. The means at our disposal should allow us to overcome insurgents easily at each encounter. But that is not what happens.

Most infantry units expect artillery and aircraft to do all the work and content themselves with mopping up afterwards - an expression heard recently from the mouth of a colonel. Left to their own devices, allied infantry keeps a respectful distance from the adversary during engagements. They keep their heads down on the terrain and then next day they find nothing.

But the role of a good infantry is to bring things to a conclusion. Its essential job is to overcome resistance. Wiping out resistance is an expression that seems to have disappeared from our military vocabulary. We speak at most of an assault, that moreover we practice rarely and that we consider as something violent, noisy and confused.

Apparently, this is not what foot soldiers are for. The truth is, though, that to break down resistance you first have to take it on and then neutralize it in order to get to within assault distance. In the end, it means eliminating it and proceeding with clean-up operations. This supposes a combination of fire power and movement that seems now to have been forgotten. The foot soldier is no longer the man for close proximity and hand-to-hand fighting.

However, a well-trained conscript is surely capable of this. It needs him to be able to crawl under the fire of his FM, get to 30 meters from the objective and then jump up behind the explosion of the grenade he has just thrown, automatic pistol at the ready.

There is much to say about the instruction methods to use, but they are already wellknown and well-established. The first REP practices them daily at its Zeralda base.

Undoubtedly, we need to find qualified instructors and then increase the instruction credits and, above all, the volume of munitions of 7.5, automatic pistols and grenades for this training.

Finally, a good infantry needs valid section chiefs and good company commanders.

They are rare. However, in four months, it must be possible to train section chiefs capable of leading infantry in combat. But it would certainly be necessary train pupils in another environment than that of Saint Maixent, the school with no terrain, no shooting range and no troop maneuvers.

The training program needs to concentrate on the essentials:

- Safe troop movement

- Overcoming resistance with different combat exercises using live rounds

- Night operations

- Orientation and topography

- Physical training, close combat, campaign life, intelligence gathering.

In our schools for active officers, there is prevalent disaffection for the infantry with infantry officers themselves often escaping to take refuge who knows where. However, the job of the foot solder, more than that of other arms needs experienced officers and men of reflection. All the problems of a foot solder are much more complicated that it would seem at first glance.

I cite one example:

A section of infantry consists of light infantry grenadiers with two FMs responsible for supporting them. The task of the officer in command of these two FMs is difficult when one thinks about it. He has to see his objective. But he also has to see the infantrymen that he is supporting so as to be able to adapt his fire to their needs. He has to see the infantrymen's section as well as see and command his own two units and understand the maneuver to displace his FM wisely.

This is just one example among many others.

Finally, I think that the superior officers in the infantry are more capable than others of being combined-arms leaders. The foot soldier who is used to using the support of other arms – artillery, ABC, aviation etc. – to his profit, is certainly the man who has the most appropriate experience and perspective.

These are the reasons why it would seem desirable to reassert the value of our infantry if we wish to get out of the kind of situation in which we currently find ourselves.

SP 88695, April 1st, 1958

Lt-Colonel Jeanpierre, Commander of 1st REP